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A B S T R A C T
Firms typically use a ‘one-size-fits-all’ (OSFA) compensation contract that specifies a common formulaic relation
between performance and compensation (i.e., a performance bonus) for non-executive managers in similar jobs.
However, a contract that is appropriate on average, may be suboptimal for individual managers if heterogeneity
in the operating environment creates varying compensation risk. We use field data from a retail firm that in-
troduced an OSFA bonus compensation plan for its store managers. The common bonus formula is based on a
weighted sum of objective measures of performance and a subjective rating made by supervisors. The firm
intended the supervisors’ discretionary subjective rating to evaluate performance on dimensions that are difficult
to measure (e.g., store appearance). We test and find that supervisors give uniformly higher subjective ratings to
managers whose objective measure of sales performance is measured with greater noise, and to managers who
face higher performance target difficulty, the latter assessed both prior to (ex ante) and subsequent to (ex post)
the evaluation period. These results obtain after controlling for manager ability and performance, and for al-
ternative mechanisms to mitigate differences in compensation risk (e.g., salary changes, sales target changes,
and bonus adjustments). The evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion in subjective ratings to provide
manager-specific risk premiums for non-executive managers who are subject to an OSFA contract.
1. Introduction
Incentive contracts that tie compensation to performance outcomes
as a partial solution to misaligned incentives between agents and a
principal have been studied extensively. The preponderance of em-
pirical compensation research focuses on the design of executive con-
tracts (e.g., CEO, CFO), where contracts are tailored to the individual
and the job. In theory, these contracts optimally balance the incentive-
alignment benefits of incentive pay with the compensation risk pre-
mium necessary to induce the executive to accept the contract
(Holmstrom 1979). The required risk premium varies with unique as-
pects of the executive’s job and uncertainty in the operating environ-
ment (cf., Prendergast 2002, 2011).
Non-executive (i.e., lower-level) managers are also frequently eli-
gible for incentive compensation. However, it is rare to see in-
dividually-tailored contracts for these managers; likely because doing
so would be prohibitively costly. Instead, firms take a “one-size-fits-all”
(hereafter “OSFA”) approach, offering a common incentive plan for
non-executive managers who have a similar job scope. These OSFA
plans typically define common performance measures, incentive
weights, and a common pay formula for the group of managers subject
to them.1 The common incentive contract that is most efficient on
average for all managers, may however be inefficient as compared with
the most efficient contract for an individual manager because hetero-
geneity in tasks or operating environments produces variation in the
compensation risk faced by managers subject to the contract.
Economic theory predicts that compensation risk will be associated
with higher salary and lower reliance on incentive pay; however, this
neglects the structural reality that salaries are adjusted infrequently and
rarely in the negative direction. We posit that using a subjective mea-
sure in the OSFA incentive plan provides a more flexible and less costly
way to provide parity in risk-adjusted compensation than writing
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individual contracts that vary in the mix of salary and bonus. In this
study, we investigate whether subjective performance ratings are set so
as to provide agent-specific risk premia for non-executive managers.
Specifically, we test whether heterogeneity in compensation risk ex-
plains cross-sectional differences in the level of subjective ratings
awarded by supervisors; specifically, whether higher ratings are given
to managers who are exposed to greater compensation risk arising (i)
from noise in objective performance measures, and (ii) from variation
in the difficulty of targets set for objective performance measures. We
control for alternative mechanisms for achieving risk-adjusted com-
pensation parity including: salary changes, performance target changes,
and other discretionary bonus pay adjustments (e.g., post hoc adjust-
ments to the payouts determined by the incentive pay formula).
We use archival and survey data from a large retail firm that in-
troduced an OSFA incentive compensation plan with no con-
temporaneous changes to base salary. The incentive plan formula in-
cludes both objective measures of sales performance (i.e., sales per
hour, sales-to-goal) and a subjective performance rating that is de-
termined by the district manager (i.e., supervisor). For all store man-
agers, the weights on the objective and subjective measures in the
bonus payout formula are the same and cannot be influenced by the
supervisor. Consistent with theory about the benefits of subjectivity in
compensation (Baker et al. 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995; Fischer
2000; Murphy and Oyer 2003), the firm intended the quarterly sub-
jective rating to be an assessment of several difficult-to-measure but
specified nonfinancial dimensions of performance (e.g., store appear-
ance, employee engagement) that are not adequately captured in a
timely manner by the objective performance measures. The new plan
was thus viewed as an improvement in the firm’s ability to reward effort
directed toward desirable tasks. However, the new incentive plan also
introduced heterogeneity in compensation risk because, while all store
managers are subject to the same OSFA incentive plan, they face het-
erogeneous operating environments. We posit that heterogeneity in the
operating environment is associated with varying compensation risk
among the managers that must be met with an increased compensation
risk premium, and that subjective ratings provide a mechanism for
providing the risk premium and achieving parity in risk-adjusted
compensation for managers performing similar jobs.2
Incentive contracts that incorporate subjectivity are, by definition,
incomplete in the sense that there is no pre-commitment as to the
monetary rewards that will be granted for observed performance
(Christ et al. 2012). In contrast to an explicit formulaic bonus plan tied
to objective performance measures, the use of subjectivity in the de-
termination of incentive pay can be characterized as an implicit contract
on which ex ante expectations about the ex post provision of monetary
rewards are based (Aranda et al. 2019). We propose that this implicit
contract can be used to achieve parity of risk-adjusted compensation for
managers who have a common explicit incentive contract but are ex-
posed to differing levels of compensation risk.
We predict that supervisors’ subjective ratings of managers will be
positively associated with three sources of compensation risk: (i) noise
in objective performance measures that is associated with operational
uncertainties in the local store operating environment (as proxied by
sales variability), (ii) ex ante difficulty of the objective performance
measure targets (as proxied by performance measure target relative to
prior year actual performance), and (iii) ex post difficulty of achieving
the objective performance measure targets (as proxied by the average
relative performance-to-goal of managers for different supervisors).
Consistent with our prediction, we find that, on average, supervisors
give higher subjective ratings to managers with noisier objective mea-
sures of sales performance. We further hypothesize and find that
supervisors use higher ex post subjective ratings to provide risk pre-
miums for managers exposed to greater compensation risk owing to
higher ex ante objective performance targets. This is consistent with
Aranda et al. (2019) who document in a field setting that subjective
bonus awards are positively associated with performance target diffi-
culty. Lastly, we hypothesize and find that supervisors use subjective
ratings to pay a risk premium for heterogeneous compensation risk
imposed by sales targets that are ex post revealed to be too difficult (cf.
Bol and Smith 2011; Aranda et al. 2019). In all tests of these hy-
potheses, we control for manager ability and performance, for store
characteristics, and for alternative ways to address inequities in com-
pensation risk (i.e., salary level, salary changes and ex post discretionary
bonus adjustments). In sum, we provide evidence consistent with su-
pervisors using discretion in setting subjective ratings to provide a
manager-specific risk premium for non-executive managers who are
subject to an OSFA incentive plan.
Interviews with senior managers involved in the design of the
compensation plan revealed that it was not the firm’s intent for su-
pervisors to use subjective ratings to mitigate store managers’ exposure
to compensation risk (as documented in prior research), even though
economic theory espouses this benefit of subjectivity (e.g., Baker et al.
1994). Nor was it the firm’s intent that subjective ratings be used to
provide differential risk premium pay (as we show). Rather it was their
intent that the subjective ratings play the theorized role of augmenting
incomplete objective performance measures. Nonetheless, we hy-
pothesize and find that in a non-executive setting such as ours where
OSFA contracts are the norm, supervisors use discretion in subjective
ratings to address heterogeneity in store managers’ compensation risk
that is associated with varied exposure to noise in performance mea-
sures and performance target difficulty. Moreover, as this aspect of
subjective ratings was not anticipated in the design of the bonus pro-
gram, we conclude that it was the result of supervisors exercising dis-
cretion in an unintended but optimizing fashion. One feature of our
setting, namely, that supervisors’ own performance evaluations are
based on how well their store managers perform, may account for their
self-motivated use of discretion to achieve parity in risk-adjusted
compensation risk for their subordinates.
This study uses firm archival data to extend prior analytical and
empirical executive compensation research to the common real-world
setting of OSFA incentive contracts for groups of non-executive man-
agers. While prior research focuses on the design of optimal contracts
for a given manager that incorporates all aspects of the contract setting
– for example, decision rights allocation, performance measures, task
complexity, and environmental uncertainty – this study focuses on non-
executive managers for whom OSFA incentive contracts are typical. We
provide evidence of the use of discretion in incentive compensation
aimed at restoring the optimality of individual-level incentives through
differential risk premiums.
Prior research documents the use of subjectivity to mitigate the
effects of operational uncertainty in incentive contracting through
lower ex ante performance targets (Bol et al. 2010) or through sub-
jective adjustments to the actual objective performance measure reali-
zations (Bol and Lill, 2015). We extend this work by providing evidence
that subjectivity is also used to pay for that uncertainty – that is, to
provide for manager-specific risk premium pay. Our findings are similar
to those of Aranda et al. (2019) and Gibbs et al. (2004), both of which
show higher ex post subjective bonuses as a means to compensate
managers for their pre-commitment to ex ante objective measure per-
formance targets that are more difficult. Our study confirms the un-
derlying premise of their study, that subjectivity serves as an implicit
contract in which managers are rewarded ex post for compensation risk
imposed on them during the evaluation period. We extend Aranda et al.
(2019) by documenting that parity in risk-adjusted compensation is
delivered indirectly via subjective ratings of managerial performance
rather than directly through subjective bonuses. We also show that
subjective ratings are used to provide differential risk premium pay for
2 The subjective ratings used in our empirical setting can be viewed as one
specific element of the more general construct of ex post subjective adjustments
that firms may use for providing a compensation risk premium.
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compensation risk generated from objective performance measure tar-
gets that are ex post revealed to be too difficult and more generally from
local operational uncertainty. Our study thus helps to provide a more
complete picture of the use of subjectivity in providing parity in risk-
adjusted compensation.
2. Theory and Hypothesis Development
2.1. The incentive compensation risk premium
Separation of firm ownership and control engenders agency costs of
managers making decisions that are not in the best interests of the
firm’s owners. The large body of agency-theory research shows that
properly designed incentive contracts that tie compensation to perfor-
mance outcomes can mitigate agency costs by aligning the incentives of
the manager with those of the firm’s owners. A well-documented
finding of this research is that because the incentive compensation
contract imposes compensation risk on agents, a compensation risk
premium must be paid to the agent to induce him to accept the contract
(Holmstrom 1979; Banker and Datar 1989; Prendergast 2002). Greater
operating or environmental uncertainty increases compensation risk
and necessitates a larger risk premium (Holmstrom 1979).
Extensive prior empirical research examines optimal incentive
contract design for executives such as CEOs and CFOs (e.g., Lambert
and Larcker 1987; Bushman et al. 1996; Core and Guay, 1999). For
executives, it is reasonable and cost-effective to individualize incentive
contracts, customizing them to the specific contract setting (e.g., the
characteristics of the manager, the task complexity, and the operating
environment, and the attributes of the performance measures being
used). By contrast, most organizations use a common, one-size-fits-all
incentive contract for groups of non-executive managers performing
similar work (e.g., plant managers, sales managers, or retail store
managers). It is not cost-effective to write individualized contracts for
non-executive managers and, in fact, doing so may expose the firm to
allegations of discrimination toward workers with similar jobs.
Non-executive incentive contracts are typically designed for groups
of managers with comparable decision-making authority (e.g., business
unit managers). However, while decision rights may be common for
these managers, operational environments often vary. As a result, non-
executive managers subjected to an OSFA incentive plan are exposed to
varying levels of compensation risk which should be associated with
commensurate variation in the risk premium paid. While an OSFA in-
centive contract that fails to address heterogeneous compensation risk
through differential risk premiums could still be optimal on average for
the group of managers covered by the contract, it may be suboptimal
for any individual manager.
There are several mechanisms for paying a differential risk premium
to non-executive managers, even in the presence of an OSFA incentive
contract. Managers subject to higher compensation risk could be given
a higher annual base salary as compared to managers subject to lower
compensation risk. A disadvantage of this approach is base salary levels
are typically permanent and non-reversible (Campbell and Kamlani
1997; Hall 2005). If risk changes over time or managers are relocated to
a business unit with a different risk profile, a more flexible way of
compensating for risk differentials may be favored.
Firms can also use contingent pay schemes that incorporate me-
chanisms to adjust for heterogeneous compensation risk. For example,
supervisors can compensate managers facing greater environmental
uncertainty through lower performance targets (e.g., Bol and Lill 2015)
or through an attenuation of the target ratcheting following high per-
formance (Bol et al. 2010). Lower targets, however, may also be asso-
ciated with incentive loss because of reduced motivation to perform
relative to the business unit’s potential (Aranda et al. 2019). Moreover,
ex ante efforts to ensure commensurate target difficulty across stores is
challenging and often results in ex post differences in realized target
difficulty.
Relative performance evaluation (RPE) schemes that tie contingent
pay to the performance of a well-crafted peer group can likewise protect
managers’ pay from the effects of uncontrollable events and avoids the
need for ex ante assessments of target difficulty (Albuquerque 2014).
Such schemes, however, rely on a high degree of uncertainty being
common across peers. Thus, the benefits of RPE are limited when there
is heterogeneity in the operating environments faced by different
managers.
Alternatively, we argue that in a setting where managers are com-
pensated under an incentive plan with common performance measures
and incentive weights, a more flexible and periodically reversible ap-
proach is to provide for differential risk premiums using ex post dis-
cretionary contingent payments – that is, monetary rewards tied to a
subjective judgment by the supervisor. Such a flexible approach relies
on the “implicit contract” of subjective performance evaluation. Aranda
et al. (2019) argue that subjectivity in performance evaluation requires
supervisors and subordinates to enter an implicit agreement whereby
subordinates take action with the expectation that their efforts will be
rewarded through the subjective part of incentive pay at the end of the
evaluation period. While past interactions in which subordinates peri-
odically observe supervisor behavior help to develop the implicit con-
tract between the subordinate and supervisor, past interactions are not
a necessary condition. To the extent that it is in the supervisor’s best
interest to optimize subordinate motivation, subordinates will form
expectations (with or without explicit communication) of how the su-
pervisor will account for the risk they are exposed to in forming sub-
jective performance ratings. It is this expectation that reinforces the
implicit contract and influences subordinate effort, and it will be in the
best interest of the supervisor to honor the implicit contract. In this
way, a contract that is de facto incomplete can still be effective in eli-
citing employee effort and performance. We posit that subjective per-
formance ratings are a mechanism of implicit agreement that can be
used to achieve parity in risk-adjusted compensation for managers
performing similar jobs.3
2.2. The use of subjectivity in incentive compensation
The use of subjectivity in incentive compensation is ubiquitous in
modern firms (Baker et al. 1994; Gibbs et al. 2004; Hayes and Schaefer
2005) and comes in a variety of forms, including subjective perfor-
mance ratings, subjective weightings of multiple performance measures
to create an overall performance assessment, discretionary bonuses,
and discretionary adjustments to objectively determined bonuses (e.g.,
Ittner et al. 2003; Murphy and Oyer 2003; Gibbs et al. 2004; Fisher
et al. 2005; Moers 2005; Bol 2008; Bol et al. 2010; Maas et al. 2012;
Demeré et al. 2019). Subjectivity is useful in contracting when di-
mensions of performance are difficult or costly to capture with objec-
tive measures or when unforeseeable, non-contractible states of nature
affect performance (Baker et al. 1994; Baiman and Rajan 1995). Sub-
jectivity allows supervisors to “correct” for perceived deficiencies in
objective performance measures (Gibbs et al. 2004, 2005; Bol and
Smith 2011; Woods 2012; Hoppe and Moers 2011) and shield sub-
ordinate compensation from uncertainty.
Much of the prior subjectivity literature examines the decision to
employ subjectivity and whether it is used more in settings that are
exposed to uncertain, uncontrollable events (Bol 2008; Gibbs et al.
2004). However, the empirical evidence is mixed. For example, Hoppe
and Moers (2011) find that discretionary bonuses are used for risk-re-
duction in CEO bonus contracts. Yet, no relation between the use of
discretionary bonuses and measures of environmental risk are found in
3While we focus on ex post subjective ratings this is a specific manifestation of
the more general construct of ex post subjectivity. Ex post subjectivity can
manifest in other ways including, for example, as ex post adjustments to ob-
jective measures.
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Murphy and Oyer (2003) or Gibbs et al. (2004). In contrast to studies
that predict a firm’s use of subjectivity, we take the incentive contract
as given and focus on whether supervisors use their discretion in sub-
jective ratings to address inequities in compensation risk among man-
agers with similar jobs.
2.3. Hypotheses
Objective performance measures provide a noisy indicator of effort
in the presence of operational uncertainty, and when used in a com-
pensation contract, noisy (i.e., less precise) objective performance
measures impose compensation risk (Holmstrom 1979; Banker and
Datar 1989). It follows that when managers are subjected to an OSFA
compensation contract while facing varying levels of uncertainty as-
sociated with the operating environment, some managers are exposed
to greater compensation risk than others. We predict that supervisors
use discretion in setting subjective ratings to address inequities in
compensation risk by awarding higher subjective ratings to managers
who are exposed to greater operational uncertainty and thus greater
noise in objective performance measures:
H1. Subjective ratings in common incentive contracts are positively
associated with operational uncertainty.
We also consider the use of subjective ratings to compensate for risk
induced by the target setting process. Performance targets provide an
opportunity to calibrate incentives prior to the performance evaluation
period. Targets can be customized to account for differences in the
operational environment. Performance targets set for managers within
an organization may vary, between managers and across time, in their
degree of difficulty, either intentionally or unintentionally. This poses
differential compensation risk in an OSFA incentive compensation plan.
To the extent that increased target difficulty is intended or at least re-
cognized, steps can be taken to mitigate the compensation risk het-
erogeneity.4 Aranda et al. (2019) find that for managers who have been
assigned more difficult ex ante targets (i.e., current performance targets
are high relative to prior year actual performance), supervisors use their
discretion to ex post award a higher subjective bonus. They argue that
the implicit agreement of the subjective bonus serves to elicit from
managers a commitment to the higher performance targets. Ex post
subjective ratings serve a similar role in fostering an implicit agree-
ment. Accordingly, we predict supervisors use discretion in setting ex
post subjective ratings as a means of compensating managers who are
given higher ex ante performance targets:
H2. Subjective ratings in common incentive contracts are positively
associated with ex ante performance target difficulty.
Hypotheses H1 and H2 make predictions regarding the use of ex post
subjective ratings to address ex ante differential compensation risk.
However, because foresight is not perfect, we propose that there will be
a residual compensation risk differential at the end of the evaluation
period. Our last hypothesis thus predicts that subjective ratings are used
to provide an additional ex post mechanism to compensate subordinates
for the varied exposure to compensation risk arising from performance
targets that are deemed ex post to be inappropriate based on the rea-
lization of outcomes influenced by unforeseen and uncontrollable
events that occurred during the period (Bol and Smith 2011; Merchant
and Manzoni 1989; Gibbs et al. 2004). Consistent with this, Gibbs et al.
(2004) provide survey evidence that firms are more likely to use sub-
jective bonuses to “recalibrate incentives in situations in which stretch
performance targets are not met (p. 429).” If such recalibration does not
occur, the incentive effects of future period targets are weakened. Thus,
by compensating for a target that ex post is revealed as too difficult,
contracting efficiency can be restored.5 Accordingly, we predict that:
H3. Subjective ratings in common incentive contracts are positively
associated with subordinates’ exposure to performance targets that are
revealed ex post to be difficult.
3. Organizational setting
The research setting is a large U.S. specialty retailer that im-
plemented a new performance-based bonus system that is based on both
objective and subjective performance measures (see also Anderson
et al., 2010). The firm has 74 company-owned retail stores that are
organized in eight geographic districts, each with a district manager
(DM) responsible for his stores’ performance. Store managers (SM) re-
port directly to a DM, and DMs report to the firm’s Director of Opera-
tions. While corporate managers retain decision rights regarding many
important aspects of the business (e.g., product portfolio and pricing,
general advertisement, store locations, hours and layout), store man-
agers have broad decision rights pertaining to store operations, in-
cluding hiring and managing the workforce, maintaining the store, and
initiating local sales promotions.
Prior to the introduction of the new bonus system, SMs received a
base salary and were awarded an annual salary increase based on the
DM’s annual assessment of the overall performance of each of their SMs
on a 1-5 scale. This subjective assessment was completely at the dis-
cretion of the DM. The firm supplied the DM with no explicit evaluation
criteria. Thus, a DM could consider any information that he believed to
be relevant to the SM’s performance, including objective performance
data (e.g., sales, growth, sales per employee hour) or observations from
store visits.
There was no formal mapping of performance assessments to pay;
however, SMs with good performance received a percentage of their
salary as an additional performance payment at the end of each year.
After the first year of employment the performance pay ranged from
5%-7% of salary. In subsequent years, SMs would receive a percentage
increase of the prior year’s performance payout percentage (i.e., prior
performance payments were never at risk).6 Over time, this system
resulted in an increasing share of total compensation being determined
by the performance payment, which ratcheted based on prior years’
performance payments and as a result, favored more tenured managers.
Under this system, the average percentage of salary associated with
performance payments was approximately 7%, with a minimum of 1%
for a first year SM and a maximum of 23% for a long-tenured SM.
The program became untenable as the labor market for SMs became
more competitive. Corporate managers realized that newly hired SMs
were unlikely to be motivated by an incentive plan that favored se-
niority and for which the mapping between performance and annual
increments in performance pay was ambiguous. The incentive strength
of the system was further weakened by the infrequent observations by
DMs of SM activities (often only a couple of times per year) upon which
the annual performance assessments were based.7 Dissatisfaction with
the old system was voiced by two SMs who criticized the casual,
4 We note that intentional ex ante target difficulty can vary across time, for
instance when in a certain time period, local circumstances favor a higher target
for a store.
5 We note that this prediction is not specific to OSFA compensation contracts,
but for such contracts this prediction provides an additional impetus to restore
contracting efficiency ex post.
6 For instance, a SM who received a year 1 performance payment of 5% of
base salary, and whose year 2 evaluation stipulated a 10% increase, would
receive a year 2 performance payment of 5.5% (5% + (5%*10%)) of base
salary; another SM who performed identically in year 2 but who had received a
year 1 performance payment of 15% of base salary would receive a year 2
performance payment of 16.5% (15% + (15%*10%)) of base salary.
7 Although new store openings provided some opportunities for advancement
to DM, new positions were limited and many SMs were unwilling to relocate, so
promotion was a weak incentive mechanism.
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infrequent basis of past evaluations:
“I know that we should ALWAYS be ready for visits. However two
visits per year is not always an accurate indicator of how a store
really looks day to day.”
“We are doing everything in our power to improve the store ap-
pearance. But when you only get one visit per quarter … or get a call
from your district manager asking ‘What would you rate yourself
this month?’… how can that be a true measure?”
After careful deliberation and consultation with DMs and SMs, the
firm adopted a new bonus system that was a radical departure from the
previous system which rewarded seniority, relied on subjective assess-
ments of SM performance with no common understanding of the as-
pects of performance that were to be evaluated, and used these as-
sessments in an undisclosed manner to arrive at an SM’s annual
performance payment. The new bonus plan provided greater trans-
parency with a formula that translated objective and subjective per-
formance into bonus pay and a checklist that enumerated the items that
the DM was to consider in the new subjective rating. Under the new
system, the bonus is awarded quarterly and calculated according to a
formula that uses four quarterly performance measures: three objective
measures (sales performance, sales per hour, and expense control), and
one subjective rating of the SM by the DM that is guided by criteria set
by the firm. The new bonus system allows SMs to earn a maximum
bonus of 20% of base salary each quarter.8 The subjective rating is tied
to the bonus award via a pre-determined formula; thus subjectivity is
limited to the rating itself, not its weight in the formula. SMs’ base
salary was not revised structurally with the introduction of the plan,
and thus was not explicitly seen as a way to address compensation risk
that the new plan would impose upon SMs.9
The three objective performance measures account for 75% of the
quarterly bonus. Sales performance is weighted 40% in bonus de-
termination, and is measured as sales relative to a sales performance
target that is set through participative goal setting between the DM and
SM. The bonus payout associated with sales performance varies linearly
within an incentive zone (i.e., a threshold of 88.4% and cap of 107% of
the goal). The second objective performance measure, sales per hour
(SPH), is measured as sales divided by the number of employee hours,
and has a bonus weight of 25%. After the quarterly sales target is ne-
gotiated, thirteen weekly SPH targets are set. To motivate SMs to op-
timize revenue and staffing costs, these targets included a lower (-3%)
and upper boundary (+20%).10 Overall SPH performance is computed
as the number of times that the store ‘hits’ its weekly SPH target in
thirteen weeks. For example, missing one weekly target by performing
outside of the boundaries results in a linear bonus decrease (i.e., one-
thirteenth times the 25% bonus weight). The third objective measure,
expense control, is weighted 10% of the total bonus and requires SMs to
reduce controllable expenses as compared to the same quarter in the
prior year.
The final component of the SM bonus, which accounts for the re-
maining 25% of the bonus, is a subjective rating by the DM that is
intended to augment the objective performance measures. The new
quarterly subjective ratings are different in purpose and content than
the annual performance assessments in the old bonus plan. In field in-
terviews with the designers of the compensation plan, the inclusion of
the subjective rating in the new bonus plan was explained as a means
for evaluating informative but specific and difficult-to-measure di-
mensions of performance (e.g., store appearance, employee engage-
ment) that are not captured by the easy-to-measure short-term financial
performance dimensions. The Director of Operations highlighted the
widespread belief that the elements of performance embedded in the
subjective rating are more predictive of future sales when she said that
she counseled SMs to “focus on your subjective [assessment], that's
what's going to drive sales.”
DMs were expected to conduct an intensive assessment of each store
each quarter. The corporate Operations Department developed a
checklist of key performance elements that DMs should consider in
determining subjective ratings. For example, DMs are encouraged to
consider: voluntary and involuntary staff turnover, store appearance
and cleanliness, accuracy of pricing, adherence to store layout direc-
tives, stock levels, and so forth. For the first time, DMs were required to
visit all stores on a regular schedule to complete evaluations. Although
the checklist directed the DM’s attention to specific performance ele-
ments, it did not stipulate how the elements are to be weighted or
measured, leaving this to the DM’s discretion (cf., Long et al. 2015).
Moreover, the DM supplies only the final overall subjective rating to the
corporate office without any supporting documentation on the different
elements in the checklist.
Importantly, the firm does not instruct DMs to adjust subjective
ratings to compensate for heterogeneity in the task environment, in the
level of operational uncertainty, or in target difficulty. The discretion
that DMs enjoy in setting the subjective rating, however, creates an
avenue for addressing heterogeneity of compensation risk among SMs.
A comment from one SM indicates that such discretion may have been
welcomed:
“I have been involved in other companies’ bonus programs…[that]
were based on the same principles yet had flexibility to be more
store-specific, knowing that every store does not have the same
problems.”
Another SM who was asked to comment on the firm’s intended
design, in which the subjective rating was merely an evaluation of
difficult to measure performance dimensions, pointed out the short-
coming of failing to accommodate store-level differences:
“I think the plan is not fair and is weighted to high performing stores
with no or very few considerations for outside factors, such as lo-
cation and amount of advertising.”
Thus, the hypothesis that DMs exercise discretion to counter in-
efficiencies in compensation contracts for individual SMs when the
OSFA contract is a poor fit with the work environment, is a hypothesis
of supervisors instinctively (perhaps with the added motivation of their
own incentive compensation plan) addressing contract failures using
discretion in a manner that was not prescribed (though not per se un-
desired) by the firm.
4. Research Methods
4.1. Data and sample
The empirical analysis uses the firm’s archival data on the perfor-
mance measures in the incentive pay formula as well as manager and
store characteristics. We also incorporate survey data collected from the
SMs and DMs to perform measurement construct validation and a
8 The bonus plan used 10% of base salary as the “baseline” bonus for meeting
goals; however, exceptionally good performance (i.e., achieving the ceiling on
all four performance dimensions) allowed an SM to earn up to 20% of base
salary and unusually poor performance (i.e., achieving the floor performance
on all dimensions) would result in no bonus payment. Six very senior SMs for
whom a 20% maximum would have constituted a decrease in total compen-
sation as compared with the prior system, had a payout range of zero to 40%. In
the first year after adoption, the average bonus for SMs was almost 13% of base
salary with a minimum of 5% and a maximum of 22%.
9 This observation is supported by tests in which we regress SM base salary
and the percent salary change after the plan was introduced on the hypothe-
sized predictor variables and control variables (except those relating to post-
plan performance). The measures of sales variability and target difficulty are
not significantly associated with either base salary or salary changes.
10 A number below the lower threshold (-3% of the target) could indicate
costly overstaffing, while a number above the higher threshold (+20% of the
target) could indicate understaffing and potentially poor customer service.
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robustness test. We collected ten quarters of archival data, five quarters
from the pre-plan period (used to measure managerial ability, sales
variability and ex ante target difficulty, as described below), and five
quarters from the post-plan period (used to test the hypotheses).
Eliminating observations with missing data leaves 242 observations
with complete archival data for testing the hypotheses. Because the ex
ante target difficulty measure generates a loss of 20 observations, we
estimate our models with and without this variable. We take the larger
sample (N=262) as a basis for reporting descriptive statistics, noting
that the smaller sample provides similar insights.
4.2. Variable measures
4.2.1. Dependent and independent variables
The dependent variable is the SM’s quarterly subjective rating
(Rating), which varies for each SM each quarter (q) and is scored on a 1
to 5 scale. The independent variables are organized according to their
corresponding hypothesis below.
Hypothesis H1 predicts that the subjective rating is positively as-
sociated with operational uncertainty faced by an SM. In our survey
data, one store manager commented, “the SPH targets are difficult to
accomplish in stores that have highly fluctuating sales on a weekly
basis.” Following this logic, we use variability in store sales, Sales
Variability, as our proxy for operational uncertainty and calculate this as
the 3-month standard deviation of monthly sales within each quarter
divided by that store’s average sales for that quarter. To avoid con-
temporaneous influences on this measure, we use the lagged measure of
sales variability for the same quarter of the prior year.11 The correlation
between the lagged and contemporaneous measure of sales variability
(0.94, p< 0.01) is very strong and indicates persistent sales perfor-
mance measure variation that supervisors can incorporate into their
subjective ratings. Using a lagged measure, however, results in 19 store-
quarter observations for new stores without prior year sales data in the
respective quarter. To avoid a loss of observations on the new store
indicator, we impute these 19 missing values with contemporaneous
sales variability, noting that results are very similar without imputa-
tion.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that ex ante objective performance measure
target difficulty is associated with higher subjective ratings. Our mea-
sure of ex ante target difficulty, which varies between stores and
quarters, is measured as the sales target of the quarter divided by the
sales level of the same quarter in the prior year (Ex ante TD= Sales
Target t / Sales t-4). We use the sales level from the same quarter prior
year because of large seasonal variation. This results in a loss of 14
observations. In addition, we exclude six outlier observations from new
stores where sales targets (more than) doubled compared to prior year
sales. This results in 242 observations available to test H2.
Hypothesis H3 predicts that ex post realized objective performance
measure target difficulty is associated with higher subjective ratings.
We compute a time-varying measure of ex post target difficulty at the
DM level, Ex post TD, as the quarterly average STG performance across
all SMs of a DM.12 We base this variable measurement on the as-
sumption that a DM will infer greater ex post target difficulty if he
observes that the average STG of his SMs is low relative to the average
STG of peer DMs. The measure is multiplied by minus one so that higher
values indicate more difficult targets.
4.2.2. Control variables
We control for several variables that can affect subjective ratings
and which may be correlated with the independent variables of interest,
including: task complexity, whether or not a store is new, the store’s
economic environment, the level of objective performance measures,
unusually high (windfall) sales, the SM’s managerial ability, the preplan
bonus payments, the incidence of SM change, and the DM’s and SM’s
experience with the new bonus plan. We also control for alternative
options for supervisors or firm management to provide a risk premium
through ex post discretionary adjustments and salary changes.
Task complexity: As a proxy for task complexity we control for store
size, Store Size, measured as square footage of the store, scaled by
1,000. Larger stores in our field setting are more complex to manage
than smaller stores because of larger and more diverse operations in-
volving more departments, a greater product variety, a more hetero-
geneous customer base, and a greater need to coordinate and supervise
more subordinates. While assignment of store managers to stores was
not random (e.g., more capable SMs being placed in larger stores), the
new bonus plan was not accompanied by reassignment of SMs.
New store: Newly opened stores lack historical information about
unique operational characteristics (e.g., characteristics of the labor
force), market opportunities, and purchase habits of local customers.
Even experienced SMs assigned to a new store need to learn how to
operate the store, hire and supervise new employees, and learn about
the local market. One store manager put it this way, “Being a new store
…, I don’t think I should be held responsible for hitting SPH on the
mark every week, because the projections are being set off another
store’s projections.” In a similar vein, another store manager argued,
“New stores suffer when plans are set too high and not adjusted ac-
cordingly.” New Store is an indicator variable set to 1 if in a quarter the
store is open for less than a year, and zero otherwise.
Store economic environment:We use two market demographic measures
to capture variation in the stores’ economic environment and performance
potential. Specifically, we use population density (i.e., square root of
number of households, scaled by 100; Number HH) and median household
income (HH Income) in the store’s immediate area. Both control variables
are supplied by the firm but purchased from a third party data source at a
single point in time; thus they vary by store but not over time.
Objective performance level: The DM observes the objective perfor-
mance measure outcomes at the time that he formulates the subjective
rating. If subordinate ability affects all aspects of performance, the
rating may be associated positively with the objective performance
measures (Murphy et al. 1993). A positive correlation may also obtain if
the DM relies on these data inappropriately to set the subjective rating
(i.e., a “spillover effect” as in Bol and Smith 2011). We control for
performance on the objective performance dimensions using two of the
objective performance measures that jointly determine 65% of the SM’s
bonus: Sales to goal (STG), and sales per hour (SPH).13 STG is measured
as the percentage of sales above or below the target (i.e., (actual sales-
goal)/goal). SPH is measured as the ratio of weeks in a quarter that SPH
is between the lower and upper limit (i.e., number of weeks out of
13).14 The theoretical range is 0-1. Sales goals are established quarterly
11 We compute sales variation within the quarter as this aligns with the
quarterly rating, and seasonality results in distinct sales patterns between
quarters that make variation across longer time periods less informative.
12 Computing an ex postmeasure of target difficulty at the sales manager level
is infeasible because observed performance is confounded with the inputs
provided (effort and ability) to realize that performance.
13 We exclude expense control, the third objective performance element of the
bonus plan, because it was discontinued during our period of study (i.e., it exists
for only the first three of the five quarters) and interviews suggest that problems
with this measure had surfaced even earlier. Specifically, there was a sense that
stores that had been profligate prior to the implementation of the bonus plan
were rewarded because they found it much easier to reduce expenses. Including
the expense control measure as additional control variable to our analyses re-
sults in similar results and inferences regarding our hypothesis tests, despite the
significant reduction in sample size. The expense control measure is not sig-
nificantly associated with the subjective rating.
14 For a few observations the number of weeks differs slightly because data
were not available for all 13 weeks, for example because the store was opened
during the quarter.
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and even unforeseen events do not prompt adjustment of the goal
within the period.
Windfall sales: An important feature of subjective ratings is that they
are determined ex post, making them useful as a way to incorporate
post-contractual information. The effect on bonus compensation of
unusually high (low) sales that may be due to good (bad) luck can be
filtered out with a lower (higher) subjective rating. We control for this
noise filtering role of subjectivity by including a variable identifying
exceptionally high “windfall” sales. Recall that the bonus system places
a cap on managers’ bonus realization of 107% of the sales target.
Exactly meeting the target provides store managers with a 10% bonus
payout, and exceeding the cap by as much as 7% can increase the bonus
percentage to a maximum of 20%. Accordingly, we include as a control
an indicator variable, Windfall Sales, that takes the value 1 when STG is
above 7%, and 0 otherwise. This holds for 5.4% of the observations.15
Managerial ability: Managers of higher ability can be expected to
perform better on both objective and subjective performance dimen-
sions. Moreover, managers of differing ability are assigned in a non-
random manner to stores with characteristics that are correlated with
the independent variables (e.g., the assignment of more capable man-
agers to large stores). Recent studies have operationalized managerial
ability as the fixed effects in a revenue performance model (e.g.,
Demerjian et al. 2012). Since SMs’ primary responsibility is generating
store sales, we similarly estimate SM fixed effects to proxy for SM
ability. As described in Appendix A and reported in Table A1, we es-
timate a sales performance regression model using data from the five
quarters before the new bonus plan was in place (N=224). In the
model, we control for Industry Growth and four store characteristics that
affect its sales potential: Store Size, New Store, population density
(Number HH) and median household income (HH Income) in the store’s
immediate area. Industry Growth captures the contemporaneous sales
trend in the firm’s specific retail segment based on indices provided by
the International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC 2005). The SM
fixed effect captures cross-sectional variation in managerial ability prior
to the implementation of the plan. Table 1 indicates a large increase in
explanatory power (F63,155= 13.14, p<0.01) of including SM fixed
effects in the base model with controls only, indicating that manager
influence on sales performance in the pre-plan period is significant. We
use the estimated coefficient, αsm, as the measure of Managerial Ability
to discriminate common antecedents that cause correlation between the
independent variables and the subjective ratings.
Preplan bonus: Because the new incentive system puts all bonus pay
at risk, SMs face the possibility that their total pay will decline under
the new system. We control for any tendency of DMs to adjust sub-
jective ratings to ensure SM total pay does not decline under the new
system (Woods 2012) by controlling for preplan bonus levels. Preplan
bonus level is also associated with SM seniority (or tenure) in the firm,
and thus additionally controls for subjective rating adjustments to ease
the transition to the new system for more senior SMs.
SM change: Across all quarters, several SMs leave or join the firm, or
switch to other stores. Disruption of store management likely will affect
performance on a number of dimensions. We have no directional pre-
diction for how this would influence the DM’s subjective rating, and
different effects are likely depending on the circumstances that
prompted the change (i.e., voluntary versus involuntary separation,
promotion versus lateral move). We control for SM change with an
indicator for whether the store has a new SM in a particular quarter (SM
Change), coded as one, and 0 otherwise.
Plan experience: With the introduction of the plan, DMs are subject
to learning effects in the rating task. However, the DM’s increased
rating experience may be confounded with SMs’ development of skills
and performance on the checklist activities that the firm intends as the
basis for the DM’s subjective rating. On balance we expect subjective
ratings to improve with time as both DMs and SMs learn. Plan
Experience is measured as an indicator variable that is set to one in the
last two of the five quarters, and zero otherwise, to differentiate be-
tween early and later stages of the new incentive plan.16
Alternative mechanisms to mitigate compensation risk heterogeneity: We
control for two alternative mechanisms that firms may use to achieve
parity in risk-adjusted compensation among store managers. First, we
control for the percentage change in salary from before to after the
introduction of the bonus plan, % Δ Salary. While salary change likely
reflects an SM’s performance achievements, the measure also provides a
control for any additional, and potentially differential, risk premium
that is paid via a salary differential.17 Second, in a few instances, dis-
cretionary overrides of the bonus formula were made by the corporate
office in order to adjust the SM bonus (internally referred to as ‘formula
override due to temporary exception’). Adjustments typically took place
in unusual situations such as when an SM changed stores during a
quarter. While infrequent, discretionary adjustments by the corporate
office may substitute for DMs adjusting subjective ratings to compen-
sate for risk, so we control for the occurrence of adjustments with an
indicator variable, Formula Override. By including these control vari-
ables, we test for a differential risk premium provided by the subjective




Hypothesis Mean Med Std. Dev Min Max
Rating 3.50 3.60 0.55 0.50 4.75
Sales Variability H1 0.26 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.64
Ex ante TD H2 1.02 1.02 0.10 0.69 1.66
Ex post TD H3 −0.19 0.34 2.82 −11.02 3.89
Store Size (1000s) 51.37 49.52 6.78 35.67 67.16
New Store 0.19 0.00 0.40 0.00 1.00
Number HH (100 s) 3.94 3.84 0.77 2.00 6.34
HH Income 42,891 41,074 9,901 26,054 69,145
STG 0.05 −0.57 4.75 −9.63 23.20
SPH 0.63 0.62 0.18 0.08 1.00
Windfall Sales 0.05 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00
Managerial Ability −0.09 −0.24 1.13 −1.91 3.18
Preplan Bonus 1.21 0.98 0.89 0.30 4.20
SM Change 0.03 0.00 0.18 0.00 1.00
Plan Experience 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00
% Δ Salary 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.07
Formula Override 0.02 0.00 0.14 0.00 1.00
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics for all variables. For one ob-
servation the subjective rating was lower (0.5) than the theoretical range (1-5)
because of a temporary exception in the quarter. Deleting this observation from
the analysis has no appreciable impact on the results. For confidentiality rea-
sons, we disguise the bonus information in this table by multiplying the Preplan
Bonus variable by a scalar. Variable definitions are provided in Appendix B.
N=262 for all variables except for Ex ante TD (N=242).
15 We also investigated unusually low sales that may reflect unanticipated
“headwinds.” In untabulated robustness tests, we include in our model an in-
dicator variable identifying observations with STG below -7%. This variable is
not significantly related to subjective ratings in any of our models and reported
results are substantially unchanged with its inclusion. Since this is a com-
paratively rare event in the period that we studied (only 10 observations), we
chose not to include this analysis in our reported results.
16 Shifting the cutoff to the final three quarters or using a linear time measure
(1–5) does not change the results.
17 Note that the new incentive plan was not accompanied with a revision of
SMs’ base salaries, and DMs do not have the authority to decide on salary
changes. Also, while the change in salary best reflects the compensation of new
risk imposed by an OSFA incentive plan, adding the post-plan salary level as a
control variable provides similar results as reported. Salary level is positively
correlated with subjective ratings and with Managerial Ability, indicating that
more capable managers receive higher salaries.
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Appendix B summarizes all variable measures.
4.3. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the variables. The mean
subjective rating is 3.50, values span the full scale (from 0.5-4.75), and
approximate a normal distribution. Mean Ex ante TD is 1.02 which in-
dicates that sales targets increase on average by 2% compared to sales
from the same quarter prior year. However, these numbers vary tre-
mendously with a minimum value of 0.69 and maximum of 1.66. Mean
STG is approximately zero, indicating that, on average, sales targets are
met. Variation around the mean is substantial (i.e., up to 10% below
and 23% above the target). STG exceeds the cap in the bonus system
(Windfall Sales) for 5% of the observations. Mean SPH is 0.63, in-
dicating that on average SPH targets are met in 8.2 of 13 weeks in a
quarter, with an observed minimum of one and a maximum of thirteen
weeks. In 19% of the observations, stores were open for less than 12
months (New Store=1), consistent with the strong growth of the
company. In addition, in 3% of the observations the SM moved to an-
other store (SM Change=1).
Table 2 reports correlations. In relation to our hypotheses, sub-
jective ratings are positively correlated with (H1) Sales Variability
(ρ=0.09, p< 0.10, one-tailed) and (H3) Ex ante TD (ρ=0.17,
p<0.01, one-tailed), but not with Ex post TD. Correlations among the




The subjective rating varies at the quarterly level (q), store manager
(or store) level (SM), and the district manager level (DM). Specifically,
the 262 observations used represent five quarters nested within 58 SMs
which are in turn nested within 8 DMs. We use multilevel modeling to
identify sources of variation in subjective ratings across levels. The
ability to estimate how variables at different levels explain variation in
subjective ratings is an important advantage of multilevel modeling
over a fixed-effects approach.
Since we aim to assess the influence on subjective ratings of vari-
ables that vary across quarters, stores, and store managers, we estimate
a two-level model that includes DM fixed effects to control for
systematic rating differences among DMs.18 The estimated multilevel
model is (cf. Bryk and Raudenbush 1992):
Level 1: Ratingq,SM,DM = α0,SM,DM + α1,SM,DM (Sales Variabilityq,SM,DM)
+ α2,SM,DM (Ex ante Target Difficultyq,SM,DM) + α3,SM,DM (Ex Post Target
Difficultyq,SM,DM) + α4,SM,DM (New Storeq,SM,DM) + α5,SM,DM
(STGq,SM,DM)+α6,SM,DM (Windfall Salesq,SM,DM) + α7,SM,DM (SPHq,SM,DM)
+ α8,SM,DM (Formula Overrideq,SM,DM) + α9,SM,DM (SM Changeq,SM,DM) +
α10,SM,DM (Plan Experienceq,SM,DM) + eq,SM,DM (1)
Level 2: α0,SM = β0 + β1,DM (Store Size SM) + β2,DM (Number HH SM) +
β3,DM (HH Income SM) + β4,DM (Managerial Ability SM) + β5,DM (% Δ
Salary SM) + β6,DM (Preplan Bonus SM) + μ0,SM
5.2. Model Estimation Results
Table 3 reports the estimation results.19 The benchmark model in
Column (1) includes SM random effects, DM fixed effects, and the
control variables.20 The coefficient estimates show no association be-
tween Store Size and subjective scores in the new bonus plan. In con-
trast, managers who are responsible for a recently opened store (New
Store) receive a higher subjective rating (coefficient of 0.23, p<0.01),
suggesting that SMs are compensated for the uncertainties that ac-
company operating a new store. SMs receive a higher rating when the
economic environment reduces sales opportunities as indicated by a
lower number of households (Number HH) in the store area (-0.11,
Table 2
Variable correlations.
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.
1. Rating 1.00
2. Sales Variability 0.09 1.00
3. Ex ante TD 0.17 0.06 1.00
4. Ex post TD −0.00 0.02 −0.05 1.00
5. Store Size 0.35 −0.01 0.21 −0.07 1.00
6. New Store 0.19 −0.01 0.22 0.01 0.38 1.00
7. Number HH −0.33 −0.02 −0.24 −0.05 −0.23 −0.11 1.00
8. HH Income −0.15 0.05 0.03 0.00 −0.03 −0.01 0.09 1.00
9. STG 0.11 −0.06 0.10 −0.53 0.15 −0.04 −0.09 −0.02 1.00
10. SPH 0.23 −0.18 0.14 −0.06 −0.05 −0.02 −0.16 0.04 0.23 1.00
11.Windfall Sales 0.01 −0.03 0.00 −0.41 0.15 0.01 −0.06 −0.01 0.60 −0.01 1.00
12. Managerial Ability 0.18 −0.05 −0.11 0.06 0.02 −0.03 −0.24 −0.29 −0.01 0.13 −0.05 1.00
13. Preplan Bonus 0.10 −0.02 −0.06 0.04 0.05 −0.07 −0.28 −0.08 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.59 1.00
14. SM Change −0.02 −0.13 0.15 0.02 −0.01 0.01 0.09 −0.02 −0.09 0.06 0.05 −0.08 −0.08 1.00
15. Plan Experience 0.10 −0.32 −0.00 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04 −0.03 −0.08 −0.01 −0.15 −0.00 0.02 0.02 1.00
16. % Δ Salary 0.34 −0.06 0.16 0.07 −0.07 0.11 −0.10 −0.21 0.03 0.22 0.01 0.09 −0.06 0.01 0.03 1.00
17. Formula Override −0.12 −0.10 0.26 0.04 0.13 0.14 0.04 −0.09 −0.12 −0.10 0.09 −0.06 −0.09 0.28 −0.11 0.03
Correlations equal to or greater than |0.11|, |0.13|, and |0.16| are significant at 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. Variable definitions are reported in Appendix B.
N=262 for all variables except for Ex ante TD (N= 242).
18 An alternative would be to use a fixed-effects specification (i.e., using in-
dicator variables for each SM and DM) which, while relying on a weaker as-
sumption about the correlation of SM-level effects and the error term, dis-
regards the between-store variation related to manager and store characteristics
(Kreft and De Leeuw 1998). Estimating OLS regressions with SM and DM fixed
effects, and clustering of standard errors by SM, provides similar results and
inferences as reported. Modeling DM random effects (i.e., level 3 variation) in
the multilevel specification instead of DM fixed effects also provides similar
results and inferences as reported.
19 Two SMs in the dataset each had only one quarterly observation, and one
had only two quarterly observations. Deleting these observations from the
analysis provides similar results as reported.
20 A random effects only model (untabulated) shows most variation occurs at
the SM level (level 2), with an intraclass correlation of 61% (39% at Level 1).
The control variables significantly explain Level 2 variation (random effect
decreasing from 0.20 to 0.04), and relatively less Level 1 variation (random
effect decreasing from 0.13 to 0.11).
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p<0.05), but there is no significant impact on ratings of HH Income.
The coefficient estimates show a significant positive association
between SPH performance and subjective ratings (0.41, p<0.01), but
not of STG performance. This result may indicate that in establishing
subjective ratings, DMs anchor on objective performance measures, in
particular those that are considered more controllable by the SM (i.e.,
SPH with weekly targets in which SMs can influence staffing levels
instead of quarterly STG that is subject to exogenous sales fluctuations).
The coefficient on Windfall Sales, while negative as expected, is not
significant.21 Although Managerial Ability is positively correlated with
subjective ratings (see Table 2), its coefficient in the multivariate model
is insignificant.
Consistent with DMs using subjective ratings to mitigate the impact
of the new system, ratings are higher for SMs with larger preplan
bonuses (0.15, p<0.05). There is no significant difference in subjective
ratings for SMs changing to other stores (SM Change). However, a po-
sitive coefficient of Plan Experience (0.08, p<0.10) indicates that rat-
ings increase over time, likely due to learning by SMs and the devel-
opment of strategies to enhance subjective performance.22
Our results further show that discretionary bonus formula overrides
(Formula Override) are associated with lower subjective ratings (-0.46,
p<0.05). This is consistent with a substitution between these alter-
native mechanisms for providing differential compensation risk pre-
miums. In contrast, the percentage change in salary is positively asso-
ciated with subjective ratings (11.25, p<0.01). A salary change may
not only capture an alternative way to compensate for risk, but also
reflect overall SM performance that has an upward influence on sub-
jective ratings.
Test of hypotheses: Column (2) reports the estimation of our full
model (i.e., equation (1)) used to test our hypotheses. The AIC and -2LL
indicate significantly improved model fit and the independent variables
explain a larger part of variation in the subjective ratings (R2= 0.55).
Consistent with H1, Sales Variability has a positive and significant
coefficient (coefficient of 0.63, p<0.01, one-tailed). Importantly, this
effect is incremental to the effects on subjective ratings of store and
local market characteristics. This provides evidence of supervisors using
subjective ratings to provide differential risk premiums to managers
facing greater operational uncertainty.
Hypothesis H2 predicts a positive relation between ex ante target
difficulty and subjective ratings. We find, consistent with this predic-
tion, a positive and significant coefficient on Ex ante TD (coefficient of
0.58, p<0.01, one-tailed). Consistent with H3 that predicts a positive
association between subjective ratings and ex post revealed target dif-
ficulty, the coefficient on Ex post TD is also positive and significant
(coefficient of 0.02, p<0.05, one-tailed). Thus, we find evidence that
both ex ante target difficulty and ex post revealed target difficulty are
uniformly positively associated with the DM’s subjective rating.23
Because the construction of Ex ante TD results in the loss of sample
size, in Column (3) we estimate our model without this variable as a
robustness test. We again find evidence consistent with hypotheses H1
and H3 that subjective ratings are uniformly higher for SMs of stores
with higher sales variability and higher ex post revealed objective
performance targets.
In sum, we find evidence in support of our hypotheses that opera-
tional uncertainty, as reflected in increased variability of sales, and
target difficulty (measured both ex ante and ex post) are associated with
uniformly higher subjective ratings. This is consistent with our theory
that operational uncertainty and differences in target difficulty impose
differential compensation risk across managers subjected to an OSFA
compensation contract. Variation in compensation risk, absent inter-
vention, results in inequity in risk-adjusted compensation. We interpret
our findings to suggest that subjective ratings can be used to provide
parity in risk-adjusted compensation. Importantly, these results obtain
after controlling for managerial ability and performance, store char-
acteristics, prior bonus levels, SM change and plan experience, and for
the potential substitution of alternative mechanisms to provide parity in
Table 3
Hypothesis tests.
Variables Expectation (1) N=262 (2) N=242 (3) N=262
Intercept 2.64*** 1.72*** 2.37***
(5.89) (2.90) (5.30)
Sales Variability H1: + 0.63*** 0.66***
(4.05) (4.30)
Ex ante TD H2: + 0.58**
(1.99)
Ex post TD H3: + 0.02** 0.02**
(2.07) (1.66)
Control variables
Store Size 0.01 0.01 0.01
(1.30) (0.99) (1.16)
New Store 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.24***
(2.65) (2.00) (2.87)
Number HH −0.11** −0.07 −0.10**
(-2.33) (-1.37) (-2.17)
HH income −0.00 −0.00 −0.00
(-0.82) (-0.77) (-0.88)
STG 0.00 0.01 0.01
(0.77) (1.41) (1.41)
SPH 0.41*** 0.54*** 0.53***
(2.67) (3.45) (3.59)
Windfall Sales −0.16 −0.09 −0.11
(-1.18) (-0.61) (-0.82)
Managerial Ability −0.01 0.01 −0.01
(-0.24) (0.10) (-0.19)
Preplan Bonus 0.15** 0.14** 0.15**
(2.55) (2.20) (2.60)
SM Change 0.17 0.17 0.22*
(1.28) (1.31) (1.73)
Plan Experience 0.08* 0.15*** 0.15***
(1.84) (3.12) (3.30)
% Δ Salary 11.25*** 10.10*** 11.05***
(5.03) (4.12) (4.99)
Formula Override −0.46** −0.39 −0.36*
(-2.36) (-1.65) (-1.89)









R2 0.54 0.55 0.57
AIC / -2LL 271/225 248/196 255/205
Notes: This table presents the results (coefficient estimates with t-statistics in
parentheses) of a multi-level model with Rating as the dependent variable (see
equation (1)).
*,**,*** indicates significance at 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 (one-tailed for hypothesized
effects; two-tailed otherwise). R2 is computed as the percentage Δ(ε+μ+υ)
compared to the random effects only model. Variable definitions are provided
in Appendix B.
21 As a sensitivity test, we re-estimate our model setting Windfall Sales equal
to 1 when STG exceeds 5% of the cap (13% of the observations). While the
coefficient on Windfall Sales remains negative and insignificant, the positive
effect of STG becomes significant (p<0.10).
22 To obtain qualitative evidence on how SMs learn to improve subjective
performance, the survey asked them to formulate their strategies to improve the
rating. Strategies mentioned more than once are (1) holding assistant managers
accountable to a greater extent, (2) going over checklists every day, and (3)
setting tighter targets for assistant managers to improve.
23 In a robustness test, we also add as a control variable the SM’s tenure as a
store director (i.e., the number of years the SM has been in that position). This
not only reflects SM job experience, but, because DM tenure is typically longer
than the tenure of any subordinate SM, also provides a close approximation of
the length of the relationship with the DM (cf., Bol 2011). SM tenure was
gathered from the SM surveys and is available for 52 SMs, providing a sample
size of 234 quarterly observations. Results are comparable to those of the main
model and SM tenure is not significantly related to the subjective rating.




Theory suggests that ex post subjectivity in determining incentive
compensation provides a useful mechanism, not only to reward hard-to-
measure dimensions of performance, but also to incorporate post-con-
tractual information into incentive compensation. That is, the effect on
incentive compensation of unusually high (low) performance that may
be due to good (bad) luck can be filtered out with a lower (higher)
subjective performance assessments. This study considers an additional
use of ex post subjectivity in providing for parity in risk-adjusted
compensation under ‘one-size-fits-all’ (OSFA) incentive contracts com-
monly used for non-executive managers.
We theorize that workplace heterogeneity is associated with varia-
tion in objective performance measure noise arising from operational
uncertainty and with differences in the difficulty of performance targets
across business units. This workplace heterogeneity, coupled with a
‘one-size-fits-all’ incentive contract results in differential compensation
risk across managers. Importantly, this effect arises because the firm
economizes on contracting by using an OSFA compensation contract for
managers who have similar but not identical work environments.
Absent any mechanism to address this compensation risk heterogeneity,
a contract that may be optimal at the firm level, can be suboptimal
when considered from the individual manager level.
We hypothesize that supervisors use discretion in setting subjective
ratings to address heterogeneity in compensation risk by delivering an
agent-specific risk premium for managers who are subject to the OSFA
contract. Specifically, we predict and find that supervisors give uni-
formly higher subjective ratings to managers who are exposed to
greater compensation risk arising (i) from noise in objective perfor-
mance measures, and (ii) from variation in the difficulty of targets set
for objective performance measures (as measured both ex ante and ex
post of the performance evaluation period). Importantly, these results
obtain after controlling for alternative mechanisms to provide parity in
risk-adjusted compensation.
We interpret our results as evidence that supervisors use discretion
in setting subjective ratings to mitigate heterogeneity in the compen-
sation risk imposed on managers by the OSFA compensation contract.
Subjectivity thus provides not only the means to reward hard-to-mea-
sure dimensions of performance and to adjust compensation ex post
based on post-contractual information, but also the ability to deliver
differential risk premiums to managers thereby achieving greater parity
in risk-adjusted compensation among managers with similar jobs. A
limitation of the analysis is that we do not have separate ratings of the
components that were intended by the firm to be included in the sub-
jective rating, so cannot empirically isolate the “abnormal” subjective
rating associated with these discretionary adjustments. Nonetheless, the
hypothesized relations between the independent variables and the
overall subjective rating are supported. Future research to extend the
findings in this manner would be useful. In particular experimental
studies that manipulate the transparency of ratings of the intended
subjective components as compared with the discretionary component
could determine whether such transparency affects the degree to which
managers exercise this discretion.
The study makes several contributions. First, it uses archival data to
extend prior analytical and experimental research on the determinants
and uses of subjectivity in compensation contracts to the question of
whether subjectivity is the vehicle for paying a risk premium. Second, it
extends empirical research on executive compensation, where contracts
are typically tailored to the manager and work setting, to the common
real world setting of OSFA incentive contracts for groups of non-ex-
ecutive managers. A common incentive contract imposes varying
compensation risk on managers by virtue of variation in the tasks they
perform and operating environments in which they work. We provide
evidence that discretion in incentive compensation is aimed at
achieving parity in risk-adjusted compensation across managers.
Finally, the research contributes to the growing body of research on
subjectivity in compensation contracting by providing field evidence on
specific sources of differential compensation risk that subjectivity may
be used to address, while controlling for alternative mechanisms for
doing so. Overall, our study provides additional empirical evidence
regarding the role that subjectivity in performance evaluation can play
in providing for efficient incentive contracting.
Appendix A
Recent studies operationalize managerial ability as the fixed effects in a revenue performance model (e.g., Demerjian et al. 2012). Since SMs’
primary responsibility is generating store sales, we estimate SM fixed effects to proxy for SM ability. Specifically, we estimate a sales performance
regression model (equation 2 below) using data from the five quarters before the new bonus plan was in place (N=224). We control for Industry
Growth and four store characteristics that affect sales potential: Store Size, New Store, Number HH and HH Income. Industry Growth captures the
contemporaneous sales trend in the firm’s specific retail segment (International Council of Shopping Centers ICSC, 2005).
SalesSM,q = αsm + α1 Store SizeSM + α2 New StoreSM,q + α3 Number HHSM + α4 HH IncomeSM + α5 Industry Growthq + eSM,q
(1)
Table A1 provides the estimation results. Column (1) includes only the five control variables (R2 = 25%), and Column (2) adds the SM fixed
effects, αsm (R2=88%). The large increase in explanatory power (F63,155= 13.14, p<0.01), indicates that manager influence on sales performance
in the pre-plan period is significant. The estimated coefficient, αsm, is the measure that we use for Managerial Ability.
We conduct two validity tests of our Managerial Ability variable. First, we compare the measure with survey data from the DMs that we collected
at the beginning of the new bonus system, before the first subjective ratings were assigned. In the survey, DMs indicated, for each of their SMs, the
extent to which they agreed (1= strongly disagree, 7= strongly agree) that the SM: (1) knows the technical parts of his/her job extremely well, (2) is
competent at his/her job, (3) is very good at his/her job, and (4) is one of the best store managers at the firm. Five DMs responded to these questions
for 45 SMs. Factor analysis of the items reveals one factor (Cronbach α=0.85). The correlation ofManagerial Ability with the DM’s assessment of the
SM ability is strong and highly significant (ρ=0.52, p<0.01). Second, correlation analyses show that Managerial Ability is significantly associated
with the pre- and post-plan salary levels (ρ=0.45 and ρ=0.48, both p<0.01), dollar salary increase (ρ=0.16; p<0.05), SM promotion in the
post-plan period (e.g., to a larger store) (ρ=0.18, p<0.01), and post-plan SPH performance (ρ=0.13; p< 0.05).24 These validation tests also
indicate that the measure captures performance variation related to the SM instead of store characteristics.
24Managerial Ability is not correlated with post-plan STG performance (ρ= -0.01; p>0.10). However, weekly SPH is the more controllable of the two objective
performance measures and better performing SMs may also receive higher sales goals, resulting in relatively similar STG performance for SMs of differing ability.
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Appendix B. Variable measures
Measure Description
Rating The DM’s quarterly subjective rating for an SM on a scale of 1-5.
Sales Variability A time-varying measure of operational uncertainty, measured as the 3-month standard deviation of monthly sales within each quarter for a store divided by
the average sales in that quarter for that store. Sales Variability is calculated for the same quarter prior year (q-4). For missing values the number is imputed.
Ex ante TD A time-varying measures of ex ante target difficulty, measured as the SM’s sales target for the quarter divided by that SM’s actual sales level for the same
quarter in the prior year (Ex ante TDq,SM = Sales Targetq,SM / Salesq-4, SM).
Ex post TD A time-varying measure of ex post target difficulty at the DM level, measured as the quarterly average STG performance of the SMs reporting to the DM.
Control variables
Store Size Store square feet, divided by 1000.
New Store Indicator variable that is 1 when the store was opened less than a year ago and 0 otherwise.
Number HH Square root of the number of households in the store area, scaled by 100.
HH Income Median income of households in the store area.
STG Quarterly sales to goal performance: (sales-goal)/goal.
SPH Quarterly SPH hit rate (0-1): number of weeks SPH within range / 13 weeks.
Windfall Sales Indicator variable that is 1 in a quarter in which STG exceeds the target by 7% or more.
Managerial Ability Store manager fixed effect from a regression (using data from before the new bonus plan introduction) of quarterly sales (Sales) on Industry Growth, and on
firm characteristics of Store Size, New Store, Number HH, and HH Income.
Preplan Bonus Bonus value in year before the new plan started.
SM Change Indicator variable that is 1 in a quarter when the store has a new SM, and 0 otherwise.
Plan Experience This construct is operationalized in three different ways; 1) L2Q: indicator variable that is 1 for last two quarters, and 0 otherwise (used in our primary
hypothesis test).
2) L3Q: indicator variable that is 1 for last three quarters, and 0 otherwise.
3) Linear: 1 for first quarter, 2 for second, …5 for fifth quarter.
% Δ Salary The percentage change in the salary from before the bonus plan introduction to after the bonus plan introduction.
Formula Override Indicator variable that is 1 in a quarter where an override of the bonus formula was made, and 0 otherwise.
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